Hazard Identification (HAZID)

What is a HAZID?

HAZID is the foundational "screening" step in the risk management process. It's the mechanism by which you transition from not knowing what you don't know, to having a documented registry of credible threats. Unlike retrospective audits that look at what has happened, or detailed failure analysis that examines component breakdowns, HAZID is prospective—it asks the fundamental question: "What could go wrong?" at a systemic level.

In the Australian context, HAZID is not merely an engineering best practice; it's a critical tool for complying with the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (WHS Act). It provides the evidentiary basis that a Person Conducting a Business or Undertaking (PCBU) has met their primary duty of care to identify hazards "so far as is reasonably practicable". Without a robust HAZID, you're effectively operating blind to the macroscopic risks that threaten your operation, your people, and your licence to operate.

You'll often encounter HAZID as the first formal "gate" in the safety engineering lifecycle. It's the bedrock upon which more granular studies like HAZOP (Hazard and Operability), LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis), or QRA (Quantitative Risk Assessment) are built. If you miss a hazard at the HAZID stage—for instance, failing to recognise that your chosen site is in a 1-in-100-year flood zone—it's highly unlikely to be picked up in later, more focused studies which assume the site selection is sound.

The methodology of structured brainstorming

You might assume that hazard identification is simply a matter of experienced people looking at a drawing and spotting problems. While experience is vital, human memory is fallible. HAZID overcomes this by using a structured approach—it combines the creative, divergent thinking of a brainstorming session with the disciplined, convergent thinking of a checklist-based review.

The "hardware" of a HAZID is the human brain—specifically, the collective intelligence of a multidisciplinary team. The "software" is the methodology, which typically follows the ISO 17776 or ISO 31000 frameworks. You don't need complex mathematical modelling or detailed Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) to run a HAZID. In fact, relying on those details can be a hindrance. Instead, you use Block Flow Diagrams (BFDs), site layouts, and process descriptions to review the design intent.

The core components

When you participate in or lead a HAZID, you're managing a process that transforms uncertainty into a structured Action Plan.

The Workshop Environment: HAZID is almost always a face-to-face (or virtual) workshop. It relies on the dynamic interaction between disciplines—the civil engineer arguing with the operations superintendent, or the environmental scientist challenging the process engineer. This friction generates insight.

The Guidewords: To prevent the team from staring blankly at a drawing, the facilitator uses "Guidewords" (e.g., Fire, Impact, Corrosion, Security). These prompt the team to consider specific types of failures in specific areas.

The Output: The immediate product is the HAZID Register. This document is a living database that lists the Hazard, the Cause, the Consequence, the Safeguards, and the Recommendations for every identified risk. This register becomes the "Risk DNA" of the project, feeding into the Safety Case, the Emergency Response Plan, and the Operational Risk Register.

Context within the risk management cycle

You should view HAZID as the "Identification" phase in the standard risk management loop: Identify → Assess → Control → Review.

Timing: You typically conduct a HAZID during the "Select" or "Define" phase of a project (Concept or Front-End Engineering Design - FEED). It's most useful when the broad strokes of the design are known, but the concrete hasn't yet been poured.

Scope: Unlike a HAZOP, which examines the internal conditions of a pipe (flow, pressure, temperature), a HAZID looks at the "big picture." You'll assess geotechnical risks, transport logistics, fire and explosion events, environmental impacts, and even security threats like cyber-attacks or vandalism.

Evolution: A HAZID is not a one-off event. While the "Design HAZID" is the most prominent, you'll also encounter "Construction HAZIDs" (focusing on temporary works and lifting), "Commissioning HAZIDs" (focusing on energisation risks), and "Decommissioning HAZIDs" (focusing on demolition and contamination).

Australian legal and regulatory context

In Australia, the landscape of workplace safety is governed by a harmonised framework (the Model WHS Laws) in most jurisdictions, with Victoria and Western Australia operating under similar but distinct state-based legislation. While the specific acronym "HAZID" isn't explicitly mandated in the Work Health and Safety Act, the process it represents is a non-negotiable legal duty.

The primary duty of care (Section 19)

Under the Model WHS Laws, the primary duty of care rests with the PCBU. Section 19 of the WHS Act states that a PCBU must ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the health and safety of workers engaged, or caused to be engaged by the person.

You cannot ensure safety if you don't know what threatens it. Therefore, the identification of hazards is the implicit first step of this duty. If a hazard exists in your workplace that was reasonably foreseeable, and you failed to identify it because you didn't conduct a structured review like a HAZID, you've likely breached your primary duty of care.

The duty to manage risks (Section 17)

Section 17 of the WHS Act is the operational engine of safety management. It explicitly requires you to:

1. Eliminate risks to health and safety, so far as is reasonably practicable; and
2. Minimise those risks so far as is reasonably practicable, if elimination is not possible.

The HAZID workshop is the formal venue where this elimination and minimisation is debated and recorded. When your team decides to move a diesel tank away from an ignition source, you're exercising your Section 17 duty to "eliminate" the risk of fire. When you decide to install a blast wall because you can't move the tank, you're "minimising" the risk. The HAZID report is the legal record that you engaged in this mandatory thought process.

The meaning of "reasonably practicable" (Section 18)

This is the most critical legal phrase you'll encounter in Australian safety law. It defines the boundary of your duty. To decide what is "reasonably practicable" during a HAZID, you must weigh all relevant matters, including:

• The likelihood of the hazard occurring
• The degree of harm that might result
• Knowledge: What you know, or ought reasonably to know, about the hazard
• Availability: Ways to eliminate or minimise the risk
• Cost: Whether the cost is grossly disproportionate to the risk

The HAZID session is where you document this balancing act. If you identify a high-consequence risk (e.g., multiple fatalities) and the control measure is cheap (e.g., changing a procedure), it's "reasonably practicable" to implement it. If the control costs $10 million for a negligible risk reduction, the HAZID team notes this as "grossly disproportionate" and rejects it. This contemporaneous record is your defence in court.

Consultation obligations (Sections 47-49)

Section 47 of the WHS Act requires you to consult with workers who are (or are likely to be) directly affected by a matter relating to health or safety. Section 48 defines the nature of this consultation: it must be a genuine exchange of views, not just informing workers of a decision.

A HAZID workshop that includes only management, design engineers, and consultants, while excluding operators, maintenance fitters, or Health and Safety Representatives (HSRs), is arguably a breach of your consultation duties. You must involve the people who do the work. They bring the knowledge of "Work as Done" versus "Work as Imagined".

Officer's due diligence (Section 27)

Officers (Directors and Senior Executives) have a personal duty to exercise due diligence. This includes taking reasonable steps to gain an understanding of the hazards and risks associated with the operations.

As an Officer, reviewing and endorsing the Major Hazard Register produced by a HAZID is a tangible way to demonstrate you're meeting your due diligence obligations. You cannot plead ignorance of a major hazard if a competent HAZID would have revealed it.

Specific industry regulations

Major Hazard Facilities (MHFs): If you operate a facility that exceeds threshold quantities of scheduled chemicals (under the WHS Regulations), you're an MHF. MHFs must submit a Safety Case to the regulator (e.g., SafeWork NSW, WorkSafe Victoria). The Safety Case must demonstrate a "comprehensive systematic identification of all reasonably foreseeable hazards." HAZID is the standard industry method for satisfying this specific regulatory clause.

Offshore Petroleum: The National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) regulates offshore safety. Their guidance explicitly references ISO 17776 and expects formal hazard identification (HAZID) as part of the Safety Case submission. For offshore facilities, failure to conduct a rigorous HAZID will result in the rejection of your Safety Case and a refusal of your licence to operate.

Mining: In Western Australia, the Work Health and Safety (Mines) Regulations 2022 require the mine operator to prepare a Mine Safety Management System (MSMS) that includes the identification of Principal Mining Hazards (PMH). In Queensland, the Coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999 and Mining and Quarrying Safety and Health Act 1999 have similar requirements for Principal Hazard Management Plans (PHMPs). A "Broad-Brush Risk Assessment" (BBRA) or HAZID is the standard tool used to identify these principal hazards (e.g., ground instability, inrush, spontaneous combustion).

How a HAZID works

Conducting a successful HAZID requires rigour and discipline. It's not a casual chat over coffee; it's a systematic interrogation of the design. The process generally follows three phases: Preparation, Workshop, and Reporting.

Phase 1: Preparation (Pre-Workshop)

The quality of your HAZID is largely determined before the meeting starts. "Garbage in, garbage out" applies strictly here.

Define the Terms of Reference (ToR): You must clearly define the boundaries of the study. Does it include the pipeline? The accommodation village? The transport route? Is it just normal operations, or does it include start-up, shutdown, and maintenance? Is this for a final investment decision, or for regulatory approval?

Node Selection: To make the analysis manageable, you break the facility down into sections called Nodes. Unlike HAZOP nodes (which are small process lines), HAZID nodes are large and thematic. Examples include Geographical Nodes ("Pit Area," "Processing Plant," "Port Facility"), Functional Nodes ("Power Generation," "Water Treatment"), or Lifecycle Nodes ("Construction Phase," "Commissioning Phase").

Defining these correctly is crucial. If a node is too big (e.g., "The Mine"), the analysis is too shallow. If it's too small (e.g., "Pump 101"), the team gets bogged down in detail.

Information Gathering: You need to provide the team with the right data to spark recognition of hazards. Essential inputs include Layouts (Plot plans, General Arrangements, Maps), Process Data (Block Flow Diagrams, chemical inventories), Site Data (Geotechnical reports, meteorological data, environmental surveys), and Previous History (Accident/incident data from similar facilities).

Phase 2: The Workshop

The workshop is the engine room of the process.

The Team: You must assemble a multidisciplinary team. A room full of only process engineers will only find process hazards. A standard Australian HAZID team includes:

• Facilitator (Chair): An independent expert who manages the process, controls the room dynamics, and ensures the methodology is followed. They must be neutral.
• Scribe: A technical person who records the discussion in real-time. This is a vital role; the scribe creates the legal record of the decision-making process.
• Project Manager: Provides the overview and scope management.
• Process/Design Engineers: Explain the design intent and technical details.
• Operations/Maintenance Reps: Provide the "reality check." They know how equipment actually fails and how tasks are actually performed.
• Specialists: As required—Environmental scientists, Geotechnical engineers, Electrical leads.

The Methodology Step-by-Step: For each Node, the Facilitator leads the team through the following cycle:

1. Explain Intent: The Engineer explains what happens in this node (e.g., "In the Fuel Farm, we store 50,000L of diesel for the mining fleet").
2. Apply Guideword: The Facilitator calls out a hazard category from the checklist (e.g., "Fire").
3. Brainstorm Causes: The team brainstorms credible scenarios. "How could a fire start?" Team: "Leak from the tanker coupling," "Static discharge," "Lightning strike," "Vehicle impact."
4. Identify Consequences: "If it catches fire, what is the worst credible outcome?" Team: "Pool fire engulfing the pump skid. Toxic smoke blowing over the admin office. Potential fatality."
5. List Safeguards: "What prevents this?" (Prevention) and "What mitigates it?" (Mitigation). Team: "Impact bollards (Prevention)," "Double-walled tank (Prevention)," "Fire detection (Mitigation)," "Foam suppression system (Mitigation)."
6. Risk Ranking: Using the corporate Risk Matrix, the team estimates the Likelihood and Consequence to determine the Risk Rating (e.g., High, Medium, Low).
7. Recommendations: If the risk is not acceptable, or if safeguards are weak (e.g., relying solely on "Operator vigilance"), the team raises an Action. Action: "Civil Lead to redesign bollard layout to protect tank from heavy vehicle turning radius."

Phase 3: Reporting and Follow-Up

The output is the HAZID Report, which includes the Minutes and the Hazard Register.

Action Tracking: The job isn't done until the actions are closed. You must integrate these actions into the project's Action Tracking System (ATS).

Ownership: Every action must have a named owner and a due date.

Close-Out: Before the next stage (e.g., Detailed Design or Construction), you must verify that the HAZID actions have been implemented. This verification is often a "Hold Point" in the project execution plan.

Comprehensive HAZID Guideword analysis

The power of HAZID lies in the Guidewords. They act as triggers to ensure no stone is left unturned. Below is a breakdown of common HAZID guidewords used in Australian industry.

Why HAZID matters

You might be tempted to view HAZID as a "tick-box" exercise to satisfy a regulator or a client. This is a fundamental mistake. When executed well, HAZID is a value-generating activity that protects capital, lives, and reputation.

Cost avoidance: The 1:10:100 rule

The "1:10:100 Rule" of project management states that correcting a defect costs $1 at the Concept phase (HAZID), $10 at the Design phase (HAZOP), and $100 at the Construction phase.

Example: A HAZID identifies that a proposed compressor station is too close to the site boundary, creating a noise issue for neighbours. You move it on the drawing—Cost: Zero. Scenario B: You miss this in HAZID. You build it. The neighbours complain. The regulator shuts you down. You have to retrofit acoustic cladding or move the compressor—Cost: Millions.

HAZID is your best opportunity to make major safety and operability improvements for zero capital cost.

Legal defensibility

If a major incident occurs, the HAZID report is often "Exhibit A" in the subsequent investigation or prosecution.

The Defence: If you can produce a comprehensive HAZID report showing that you identified the risk, assessed it, and implemented controls that were considered "good practice" at the time, you have a strong defence against charges of negligence. You've demonstrated "Due Diligence."

The Liability: If the report is shallow, missing obvious hazards, or if the actions were never closed out, it becomes a "Smoking Gun" that proves you knew about the risk and failed to act. This can lead to massive fines and imprisonment for Officers under the WHS Act.

Project definition and scope accuracy

HAZID often highlights non-safety issues that affect project viability. Identifying "Soft Ground" might trigger the need for piling, which changes the budget and schedule. Identifying "Road Width Constraints" might mean you can't deliver the prefabricated modules you planned.

Identifying these "Showstoppers" early prevents "scope creep" and budget blowouts later. It forces the project team to confront reality.

Safety culture and alignment

Bringing operations personnel into the room with design engineers helps align the team. It gives the workforce a voice in the design, meeting consultation obligations. It ensures designers understand the practical constraints of the site (e.g., "You can't put a valve there, it's underwater half the year").

When operators see their concerns written into the Hazard Register, they take ownership of the safety systems.

Common challenges

Despite its immense value, HAZID is fraught with challenges. You must be aware of these pitfalls to avoid a "garbage in, garbage out" scenario.

Cognitive biases

Because HAZID is qualitative and relies on human judgement, it's highly susceptible to the psychological flaws of the participants.

Groupthink: This is the most dangerous bias. It occurs when the desire for harmony or conformity results in irrational decision-making. Junior engineers may stay silent to agree with a senior manager, or the team may rush to consensus to finish the workshop early. This leads to hazards being glossed over.

Optimism Bias: Project teams naturally want the project to succeed. They subconsciously assume their design will work. They underestimate the likelihood of failure ("That won't happen here," "Our guys are too smart for that").

Confirmation Bias: The team may only look for evidence that supports their current design choices, ignoring contradictory information (e.g., dismissing a geotechnical report that suggests instability).

Authority Bias: If the Project Director is in the room and dismisses a risk, the rest of the room will likely fall in line.

Lack of imagination

HAZID requires you to imagine failure. If your team is too focused on the "happy path" (normal operations), they'll fail to identify the "unhappy path" (upset conditions). You need a facilitator who challenges assumptions and asks, "What if?".

Timing issues

Too Early: If you hold the HAZID before you have a layout, the discussion becomes abstract and vague.

Too Late: If you hold it when the design is "hardened," the team will be resistant to making necessary changes because of the rework involved. They'll try to "engineer away" the risk with procedures rather than design changes.

"Facile" recommendations

A common failure in HAZID reports is the generation of weak recommendations.

Weak: "Ensure operator is trained." "Update procedure." "Operator to be vigilant." (These rely on human reliability, which is low).

Strong: "Relocate tank." "Install crash barrier." "Automate shutdown." (These rely on physics and engineering).

You should always push for Engineering Controls (Elimination, Substitution, Isolation) over Administrative Controls using the hierarchy of controls.

Incompetent facilitation

The Facilitator is the conductor of the orchestra. An inexperienced facilitator may let the meeting drift into detailed design solutions (solving the problem) rather than staying in hazard identification (finding the problem). They may fail to manage a dominant personality who shuts down others, act as a scribe rather than a challenger, or allow the team to skip guidewords to save time.

Best practices

To lead or participate in a high-quality HAZID, adopt these best practices.

The pre-mortem technique

To combat Optimism Bias, run a "Pre-Mortem" exercise at the start of the workshop.

The Prompt: "Imagine it is two years from now. The project has been a catastrophic failure. The plant exploded, or we killed someone. Write down why it happened."

The Process: Give everyone 5 minutes to write silently (combating Groupthink). Then go around the room.

The Result: This psychological trick frees the team to voice their deepest concerns without feeling like they're being "negative" or "blockers." It often surfaces the critical risks (e.g., "The contractor was cheap and incompetent") that polite conversation hides.

Diverse team selection

Don't fill the room with only engineers. You need "Cognitive Diversity."

Include the User: Include an operator who will actually run the plant. Include a maintenance fitter. Their "work-as-done" perspective often contradicts the engineering "work-as-imagined" drawings.

Include the Outsider: Sometimes, having someone from a different asset or a different company can break the "we've always done it this way" mentality.

Rigorous scribing

The scribe should project the worksheet on a screen so everyone can see what is being written. The wording must be precise.

Bad Entry: "Fire risk."

Good Entry: "Potential for pool fire due to diesel tank rupture caused by heavy vehicle impact resulting in thermal radiation to adjacent office block."

Why: The second description allows you to design specific safeguards (barriers for vehicle impact, fire walls for the office), whereas the first is too vague to act upon.

Anonymous voting for risk ranking

When ranking risks (High/Medium/Low), use anonymous voting (e.g., using a polling app or secret ballot) if the room dynamic is uneven. This prevents the "Authority Bias" where everyone just agrees with the most senior person in the room.

Use a validated checklist, but don't be a slave to it

Don't rely on memory. Use a standard checklist derived from ISO 17776 or industry bodies (like API or IOGP) to ensure you don't miss categories like "security" or "health". However, use the checklist as a servant, not a master—allow free brainstorming first, then use the list to catch what was missed.

Techniques: HAZID vs. SWIFT vs. HAZOP vs. JSA

It's vital to use the right tool for the right job. Using HAZID for detailed design checks is too vague; using HAZOP for layout checks is too slow.

HAZID vs. HAZOP

HAZID (Macro): Looks at the facility from a helicopter view. Hazards are external and gross (e.g., "Flood," "Fire," "Collision"). It happens early (FEED).

HAZOP (Micro): Looks at the facility through a microscope. It examines process lines node-by-node. Hazards are deviations (e.g., "Flow High," "Pressure Low"). It happens later (Detailed Design).

Analogy: HAZID checks if you built the house in a swamp. HAZOP checks if the plumbing leaks.

HAZID vs. SWIFT (Structured What-If Technique)

SWIFT: A streamlined alternative that uses a "What-If" questioning structure (e.g., "What if the power fails?") rather than strict guidewords.

Comparison: SWIFT is faster and more flexible, making it ideal for simpler systems, procedural reviews, or modifications (Management of Change). HAZID is more rigorous and comprehensive, making it better for major greenfield projects.

SWIFT relies more on the experience of the team to ask the right questions, whereas HAZID provides a stronger checklist "safety net".

HAZID vs. JSA (Job Safety Analysis)

HAZID (System): Focuses on the design and the facility. It's a desktop engineering study.

JSA (Task): Focuses on the worker and the task. It happens in the field, right before work starts (e.g., "Changing a valve"). JSA identifies hazards like "pinch points" or "slippery floor" for a specific job.

Hierarchy: HAZID ensures the plant is safe to operate; JSA ensures the maintenance on that plant is performed safely.

Industry specific applications

Mining (Australia)

In the Australian mining sector, HAZID is heavily focused on Principal Mining Hazards (PMH) as defined in legislation (e.g., WHS Mines Regulations).

Key hazards include Strata Failure (ground control and geotechnical stability), Inrush (the risk of water or gas entering workings), Vehicle Interaction (the interaction between giant haul trucks and light vehicles is a leading cause of fatality), and Spontaneous Combustion (particularly in coal mining, stockpile management and ventilation are critical HAZID nodes).

Construction & Infrastructure

For major infrastructure (tunnels, bridges), HAZID focuses on the construction methodology itself.

Key considerations include Latent Conditions (unknowns in the ground—asbestos, old workings, contamination), Public Interface (traffic management, hoardings, pedestrian safety), and Temporary Works (scaffolding, formwork, and cranes). A specific "Construction HAZID" is often held to review the methodology of building the asset, distinct from the design of the asset itself.

Renewable Energy (Hydrogen/BESS)

With the rise of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) and Hydrogen, HAZID is evolving.

For Hydrogen, the focus is on "colourless flame" detection, embrittlement of steel pipes, and high-pressure release. The "leak to ignition" timeline is much faster than natural gas.

For Batteries (BESS), the focus is on "Thermal Runaway" events. A HAZID for a BESS will ask: "If one cell goes into thermal runaway, how do we prevent propagation to the whole module? How do we manage the toxic off-gas plume?".

Critical perspective

While HAZID is indispensable, you must approach it with a critical eye. It's not a magic bullet.

The "tick-box" trap

Many organisations treat HAZID as a compliance hurdle. They run the workshop to generate the paper, not to find the risk. If the recommendation column is empty, or filled with "Check during detailed design," the HAZID has failed. It has merely deferred the risk.

The "paper safety" vs. "real safety" gap

A HAZID can create a false sense of security. You have a spreadsheet saying the risk is "Low," but if the safeguards listed (e.g., "Operator Competence") don't exist in reality (e.g., high turnover, poor training), the spreadsheet is a fiction. HAZID relies on the assumption that safeguards work. You must verify them.

Static vs. dynamic

A HAZID is a snapshot in time. As soon as the design changes (which it will), the HAZID is outdated. Best practice organisations treat the HAZID as a "live" document that is revisited during Management of Change (MoC) processes. A "frozen" HAZID is a dead document.

Key Regulatory and Industry References

While a formal bibliography is not standard for this type of operational report, you must be familiar with the following key standards and legislation that govern HAZID in Australia:

• Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Model Laws) - Specifically Sections 17-19 (Duty of Care and Risk Management) and Sections 47-49 (Consultation)
• ISO 17776: Petroleum and natural gas industries — Offshore production installations — Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification and risk assessment - The global gold standard for HAZID methodology
• ISO 31000: Risk Management – Guidelines - The overarching framework for risk management
• Safe Work Australia: Code of Practice – How to Manage Work Health and Safety Risks - Provides the practical interpretation of the WHS Act
• NOPSEMA Guidance Note N-04300-GN0107: Hazard Identification - Critical reading for the offshore energy sector

Works cited

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2. Introduction to HAZID (Hazard Identification) Studies - Gexcon, accessed December 21, 2025, https://www.gexcon.com/resources/blog/introduction-to-hazid/
3. Hazard Identification (HAZID) - Gexcon Consulting, accessed December 21, 2025, https://www.gexcon.com/consulting/process-hazard-analysis/hazard-identification-hazid/
4. HAZOP vs HAZID: Key Differences and Applications Explained - Get Expert Insights, accessed December 21, 2025, https://www.ors-consulting.com/hazop-vs-hazid
5. Structured what-if technique - Wikipedia, accessed December 21, 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structured_what-if_technique
6. Identify, assess and control hazards - Managing risks | Safe Work Australia, accessed December 21, 2025, https://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au/safety-topic/managing-health-and-safety/identify-assess-and-control-hazards/managing-risks
7. Regulatory guide - Primary duty of care - Comcare, accessed December 21, 2025, https://www.comcare.gov.au/scheme-legislation/whs-act/regulatory-guides/primary-duty-of-care
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